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Abstract
Competition law sets limits on the exercise of intellectual property rights by dominant 
companies, namely in cases involving standard essential patents (SEPs). This article 
will examine the framework for SEP owners’ right to seek an injunction, discussing 
competitive problems that such situations may cause as well as the solutions 
adopted by the European Institutions, comparing them with the US and Japanese 
approach, and finally reflecting upon the opportunity for a new test for a new type 
of abuse. Although the three legal orders – US, EU and Japan – apply different 
laws establishing a general presumption against injunctions in SEPs encumbered 
with FRAND commitments, their goal is the same: to protect the interest of the 
SEP holder to obtain a remuneration without an abusive recourse to injunctions. 
I will argue that, in the EU, the Huawei case created a new test for a new type of 
abuse, improving the comprehensibility and certainty for the companies involved in 
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standardization across Europe and allowing the harmonization of national judicial 
solutions regarding the seeking of injunctions in the SEPs context. In spite of some 
uncertainties, the new test clarifies the role that competition rules should play in 
cases of abuses by SEPs owners.
Resumé
Le droit de la concurrence fixe des limites à l’exercice des droits de propriété 
intellectuelle par les entreprises dominantes, notamment dans les affaires 
concernant des brevets essentiels standard (standard essential patents, SEPs). Cet 
article examinera le cadre du droit des propriétaires de SEP de demander une 
injonction en discutant des problèmes de la concurrence que de telles situations 
peuvent causer ainsi que des solutions adoptées par les institutions européennes. 
Ces solutions seront ensuite comparées avec l’approche américaine et japonaise. 
Enfin, l’auteur réfléchira à l’opportunité d’un nouveau test pour un nouveau type 
d’abus. Bien que les trois ordres juridiques – les États-Unis, l’UE et le Japon 
– appliquent des lois différentes établissant une présomption générale contre les 
injonctions dans des SEP grevés d’engagements FRAND, leur objectif est le même: 
protéger l’intérêt du titulaire du SEP d’obtenir une rémunération sans recours 
abusif aux injonctions. Je soutiendrai que, dans l’UE, l’affaire Huawei a créé 
un nouveau test pour un nouveau type d’abus, améliorant la compréhensibilité 
et la certitude pour les entreprises impliquées dans la normalisation en Europe 
et permettant l’harmonisation de solutions judiciaires nationales concernant la 
recherche d’injonctions dans le contexte des SEP. Malgré quelques incertitudes, le 
nouveau test clarifie le rôle que les règles de la concurrence devraient jouer dans 
les cas d’abus par des propriétaires de SEP.
Key words: abuse of dominant position; FRAND commitments; seeking an 
injunction; standard essential patents; willing licensee.
JEL: K21
I. The Huawei case
Competition law sets increasingly stringent limits on the exercise of 
Intellectual Property Rights by dominant companies in cases involving Standard 
Essential Patents (SEPs). In this context, the Huawei v ZTE case, concerning 
a patent dispute between two Chinese companies, may become a landmark 
judgment1. It is another case of patent wars in the EU, whereby a SEPs holder 
seeks an injunction to exclude potential licensees from the market.
1 CJ judgment of 16.06.2015, Case C-170/13 Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. v ZTE, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:477.
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Huawei is a Chinese telecommunications company which holds a European 
patent regarded as essential to the Long Term Evolution (hereinafter, 
LTE) standard developed by the standard-setting organization – European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (hereinafter, ETSI) for fourth 
generation mobile phones. Huawei is a member of ETSI and had made 
a  commitment to grant licenses to third parties on fair, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory terms (hereinafter, FRAND). Therefore, Huawei entered 
into negotiations with ZTE, a multinational mobile phone producer, for 
the conclusion of a licensing agreement on FRAND terms. However, those 
negotiations were not successful and Huawei brought an action for a patent 
infringement before a German court against ZTE, in order to obtain an 
injunction prohibiting the continuation of the infringement and an order for the 
rendering of accounts, the recall of products and the assessment of damages. 
ZTE claimed it was a willing licensee and that its competitor Huawei was abusing 
its dominant position by seeking injunctions. In the course of this dispute, the 
German Court referred several questions to the European Court of Justice 
(hereinafter, CJ) seeking to ascertain whether, and in which circumstances, an 
action for infringement, brought by a SEP owner encumbered with FRAND 
commitments against a manufacturer of products complying with that standard, 
represents an abuse of dominant position under EU competition law.
The CJ tried to clarify the limits of the SEP owner’s right to seek an 
injunction prohibiting the alleged infringement of its patent by the prospective 
licensee, stating that the pursuit of an injunction against a potential willing 
licensee may amount to an abuse of a dominant position. The difficulties 
in reconciling this solution with the previous case law of the CJ regarding 
unilateral refusal to license raises the question of whether we are facing a new 
type of abuse and a new test for it.. This article will examine the framework 
for SEP owner’s right to seek an injunction, referring the anti-competitive 
problems that such situation may raise and the solutions that have been 
pointed out by the European Commission and the Court of Justice, comparing 
them with the ones followed by the US and Japan. It will end shedding some 
light on the opportunity of a new test of abuse, after analysing some relevant 
national decisions taken after the Huawei judgment.
II. The anti-competitive issues
Although nowadays competition law and intellectual property law are 
considered complementary, as both seek innovation and growth2, there are 
2 There is a large consensus nowadays between US and European antitrust agencies 
concerning the goals of competition law. Taking into account the lessons from Schumpeter, it is 
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still certain areas of tension in which antitrust law should apply. Particularly 
relevant is the possibility to apply Article 102 TFEU to a SEP holder abusing 
its dominant position3, as it is discussed in the Huawei case.
In order to fully understand the antitrust concerns involved in SEPs 
licensing, it is necessary to recall the concepts of SEPs and standards as well 
as the benefits of standardization.
SEPs are patents that are essential to implement a specific industry standard. 
For example, it has been estimated (Italianer, 2015) that 100,000 patents are 
relevant to manufacture smartphones4. Therefore, products that comply with 
a certain standard cannot be manufactured without those patents.
generally accepted that competition law protects competition in order to promote efficiency and 
consumer welfare and that technical changes, strengthened by intellectual property rights, also 
promote efficiency and welfare gains. So the antitrust IP interface should find an equilibrium, 
allowing antitrust authorities to pursue anti-competitive practices without compromising 
innovation in the process. On this topic, cf. Lianos and Geradin, 2013, pp. 561–587; Greaves 
and Nasibyan, 2016, pp. 159–177; Jones and Sufrin, 2016, pp. 826–883; Hovenkamp, 2016, 
pp. 303–332 and also the US Department of Justice – Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual 




3 The interface antitrust-IP can, therefore, raise certain concerns, as it is the case of “patent 
ambush” or “patent trolls”. For the first scenery, see the Rambus case – COMP/C-3/38 636 
Rambus – concerning intentional deceptive conduct, in the context of the standard-setting 
process; the company could commit an abuse by not disclosing the existence of the patents and 
subsequently claiming unreasonable royalties for the use of those relevant patents (although, in 
the Rambus case, Article 102 did not apply, as Rambus had low market power in the beginning 
of the standardization process); see also the similar case C-457/10 AstraZaneca v Commission, 
judgment of 6.12.2012, in which the Court held that misleading representation made by 
a dominant firm to patent offices in several Member States, in order to obtain the issue of 
Supplementary Protection Certificates to which they were not entitled, and deregistration of 
the (pharmaceutical products) marketing authorizations in several Member States, without 
justification, to prevent the appearance of competing generic drugs could constitute an abuse. 
On the other hand, “patent trolls” (also called “Patent Assertion Entities” or “Non Practicing 
Entities” (hereinafter, NPE) concern companies that do not manufacture products or are not 
engaged in research and development, but enforce patent rights against infringers; NPE became 
a source of litigation in the US, because it did not have the loser cost regime until Octane 
Fitness, LLC v ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. and Highmark v Allcare Health, issued in 2014, in 
which the Supreme Court made the applicability of the loser pay for attorney costs easier if 
the lawsuit was considered baseless. In this article we will only address seeking an injunction 
by a SEPs holder under Article 102 TFEU.
4 The concept of “standard” depends on the context in which the term is used. Nevertheless, 
similar definitions have been adopted by the World Trade Organization (Technical Barriers 
to Trade Agreement, Annex 1–2), Standards Organization (ETSI) and European Institutions, 
such as the European Commission. In the EU, the concept given in Directive 98/34/EC of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 22 June 1998 (OJ L 2004, 21.7.1998, p. 37), laying down 
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Standards can be approved by a Standard Setting Organisation or, in more 
rare situations, result from the market development shaped by consumer 
choices. Standards, as the former head of the European Commission’s 
Directorate-General for Competition Directorate-General for Competition 
A.  Italianer explains, form the basis of success of technology we take for 
granted – radio, cable-TV, Wi-Fi, computers, mobile phones, railroads, internet 
– being important to industry, manufacturers and consumers (Italianer, 2015).
The benefits of standardization are obvious, whether in terms of efficiency 
– reducing transaction and production costs, increasing efficiencies and 
reducing the level of uncertainty about the outcome of R&D investment – or 
interoperability. In other words, compatibility among related products will 
allow systems and devices to interconnect through the same technology; hence, 
information, data and services can be exchanged among them and/or their users.
The EU has promoted standardization as a “tool for European 
competitiveness”5, as it enables consumers to switch more easily between 
products from different manufacturers and strengthens the integration of 
national markets in order to complete the internal market.
Standards may, however, raise antitrust concerns, particularly when 
competing technologies are eliminated in favour of the selected one. In this 
context, as Shapiro emphasized, in the beginning of the twenty-first century 
(Shapiro, 2001, pp. 119–150), involuntary infringement of patents might favour 
abusive conducts by the SEPs owners. In fact, the dominant firm owner of the 
patents essential to that standard may hold up manufacturers by imposing 
excessive royalties, or other abusive conditions, to the potential licensees 
(given the sunk cost supported by them) or even refuse to license the patent 
through an injunction against the infringer.
In order to address these concerns, standard-setting organizations 
(hereinafter, SSO) require SEPs owner to commit to license on FRAND 
terms. This commitment will assure SEPs holder an adequate remuneration 
and at the same time prevent the hold-up issue, giving all the market players 
access to a standard. In practice, FRAND commitments do not always avoid 
anti-competitive conducts by SEPs owners and competition law intervention 
might be necessary.
a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations, 
as amended by Directive 2006/96/EC of 20.11 and Regulation 1025/2012 of 25.10 is particularly 
clear: “standard is a technical specification approved by a recognized standardization body for 
repeated or continuous application, with which compliance is not compulsory” (Article 1(4)); 
in addition, to these formal standards there are also de facto standards that arise in the market 
as a result of consumer choices or the conduct of a certain undertaking); it can promote 
interoperability and efficiency.
5 Commission Decision of 29.04.2014, Case AT.39939 – Samsung – Enforcement of UMTS 
standard essential patents, Brussels, C (2014) 2891 final, no. 22.
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The need for antitrust intervention is not, however, a consensual matter. 
While some authors (Geradin and Rato, 2007, pp. 101–161; Petrovčič, 2013, pp. 
1363–1386) consider that only in rare situations will the standard-setting lead 
to exploitative abuse, others (Kobayashi and Wright, 2009, pp. 496–515) doubt 
the ability of competition laws to address this kind of concerns and with others 
suggest it would be preferable to apply Patent Law or Civil Law (Larouche and 
Zingales, 2014; Jones, 2014, p. 1 et seqq; Nihoul, 2015, p. 151 et seqq).
Nevertheless, antitrust agencies on both sides of the Atlantic agree that 
antitrust rules should apply when a dominant SEP owner requests an injunction 
against infringers of a FRAND-encumbered patent, as it might lead to anti-
competitive abuses.
III. The background: EU and national praxis
The applicability of Article 102, or its equivalent in the national law, to 
SEPs holders seeking an injunction against infringers was addressed, in the 
beginning, by national courts, particularly by German ones. In 2009, the 
German Federal Court of Justice decided on the anti-competitive concerns 
of injunctions in the so-called “Orange Book Standard” case, which did not 
involve FRAND commitments. The Court stated that even before signing an 
agreement, companies have to behave as a licensee and pay royalties, at least 
into an escrow account, and provide regular account of those payments. On the 
other hand, the party seeking the license must make a binding, unconditional 
and reasonable offer for it. The German court applied the compulsory licence 
defence in a conservative way as it is considered an exception to the right of 
patent enforcement.
The test established by the German court was different from the one 
followed by the European Commission some years later, when the European 
institution issued decisions concerning seeking injunctions by dominant SEPs 
owners against infringers of FRAND encumbered patents. On the one hand, 
the Orange Book Standard test did not apply to SEP cases. On the other 
hand, the Commission’s approach to these cases was more generous than the 
German Court’s decision. For instance, it did not consider, as some lower 
German courts did, a potential licensee as an unwilling licensee if it challenged 
the validity or essentiality of the patent. It should be noticed, however, that 
some literature considers that the Commission exaggerated the consumers’ 
marginal benefit of validity challenges to licensed SEPs6.
6 In other words, economic analysis would not support the assumption of the European 
Commission. Therefore, if the outcome of discovering a few invalid patents in a licensed 
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The first infringement decision adopted by the European Commission was 
the Motorola decision7. In this case, Motorola owned a SEP reading on the 
General Packet Radio Service (hereinafter, GPRS) standard (part of the 2G 
mobile telecom standard) and had committed to the ETSI to license it on 
FRAND terms and conditions. In April 2014, the Commission decided that 
a SEP owner’s request of an injunction was an abuse and ordered Motorola 
to eliminate the negative effects of its conduct. The Commission found that 
in the exceptional circumstances of this case (the standard setting process 
and Motorola’s commitment to license the SEP on FRAND terms) and in 
the absence of any objective justification (Apple was not unwilling to enter in 
a licence agreement on FRAND terms), Motorola had infringed Article 102 
TFEU by seeking and enforcing an injunction against Apple before the Court 
of the Federal Republic of Germany.
The Commission strengthened the concern, already mentioned in 2012, in 
the Google/Motorola Mobility8 merger clearance, that the threat or the seeking 
of injunctions could be used to exclude competing products from the market 
or to impose burdensome licensing terms.
A fine was not imposed, however, by the Commission in this case as there 
were no previous decisions of the Commission or case-law of the Court in 
these matters and national decisions were divergent. Nevertheless, as the 
former Competition Commissioner Joaquin Almunia mentioned, the EU and 
the US “share the view that a FRAND commitment given in a standardization 
context means that the holder of standard-essential patents can no longer 
issue an injunction if the licensee is willing to negotiate a FRAND license” 
(Almunia, 2013).
In a similar case, concerning 3G UMT (Universal Mobile Telecommunication 
System) SEPs, owned by the Samsung company9, the European Commission 
enforced the safe harbour test shaped in the Motorola case (outside this 
safe harbour, however, no more guidance was provided). The Commission 
in its Statement of Objections (issued in spite of Samsung’s withdrawal of its 
injunction request as this had already caused harm) considered that under the 
specific circumstances where a commitment to license SEPs on FRAND terms 
had been given and where a potential licensee (in this case Apple) had shown 
portfolio containing hundreds is to reduce royalties or delay, in a opportunistic way, the 
payment of those royalties, SEP owners’ incentives to invest may decrease and harm consumers; 
see, Sidak, 2016, pp. 191–211.
7 Commission Decision of 29.04.2014, Case AT.39985 – Motorola – Enforcement of GPRS 
standard essential patents, Brussels, C(2014) 2892 final. See Angeli, 2015, p. 221 et seqq.
8 Commission Decision of 13.02.2012, Case No COMP/M.6381 – Google/Motorola Mobility, 
Brussels, C(2012) 1068.
9 Case AT.39939 – Samsung – Enforcement of UMTS standard essential patents, Brussels, 
C (2014) 2891 final.
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itself to be willing to negotiate a FRAND licence for the SEPs, recourse to 
injunctions harms competition, as it can exclude products from the market, 
harm consumers and hinder innovation.
A SEP holder is entitled to take reasonable steps to protect its interests by 
seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions against a potential licensee in, 
for example, the following scenarios: “(1) a potential licensee is in financial 
distress and unable to pay its debts; (2) a potential licensee’s assets are located 
in jurisdictions that do not provide for adequate means of enforcement of 
damages; or (3) a potential licensee is unwilling to enter into a license agreement 
on FRAND terms”10. As such conditions were not met in the Samsung case 
(in fact, Apple made six offers including an unconditional licensing offer, 
deposited funds into an escrow account and agreed to let Motorola define 
the royalties subject to judicial review by German courts), the Commission 
informed Samsung that its injunctions could be an abuse of dominant position 
and Samsung offered commitments under Article 9 (proposed a specific 
licensing framework, and promised not to seek injunctions).
Several and pertinent doubts were cast by these two European Commission 
decisions: What is a willing licensee? Is it sufficient that the licensee merely 
declares its willingness or should the licensee act in accordance? Should the 
licensee make the first offer or is it enough to request an offer?
Some of these uncertainties were addressed by the Advocate General 
Melchior Wathelet and the Court of Justice in the Huawei case, concerning 
a Chinese Telecommunication company holding a European standard essential 
patent that sought injunctions against ZTE in the Dusseldorf Regional 
Court. The German Court referred to the Court of Justice several questions 
concerning the applicability of competition law to SEPs holder seeking an 
injunction against infringers of FRAND encumbered licences.
The Advocate General (hereinafter, AG) in his Opinion proposed a “middle 
path” and held the need to strike a balance between the right to intellectual 
property and the SEP owner’s right of access to the courts, under Article 47 
of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU and the freedom of 
companies implementing the standard to conduct business, protected by 
Article 16 of the Charter11. In addition, the AG enhanced the differences 
between the Orange Book Standard case and Huawei: while in the Huawei 
case a formal standard was adopted and FRAND commitments assumed, the 
10 Cf. Press Release of 21.12.2012: Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections 
to Samsung on potential misuse of mobile phone standard-essential patents. Retrieved from: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1448_en.htm (1.5.2016).
11 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, delivered on 20 November 2014, Case C-170/13 
Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v ZTE Corp., ZTE Deutschland GmbH, paras 52, 66.
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Orange Book Standard case concerned a de facto standard and no FRAND 
commitments were agreed.
It is an abuse, according to the AG, and it should be considered a solution 
of last resort, the fact that a holder of a SEP, which has given a commitment to 
grant third parties a licence on FRAND terms, has required an injunction or 
corrective measures where it is shown that the SEP holder has not honoured 
its commitment, even though the alleged infringer has shown itself to be 
objectively ready, willing and able to conclude such a licensing agreement. 
Before such last resort action is taken, the SEP holder has to alert the alleged 
infringer to that fact in writing, giving reasons and presenting a written offer 
of a license on FRAND terms with all the information and conditions usually 
established in that sector, particularly the precise amount of the royalty and 
the way in which that amount is calculated and if necessary request that the 
FRAND terms be fixed either by a court or by an arbitration tribunal.
In addition, it is legitimate for the SEP holder to ask the infringer either 
to provide a bank guarantee for the payment of royalties or to deposit 
a provisional sum at the court or arbitration tribunal in respect of its past 
and future use of the patent.
On the one hand, the infringer must respond to that offer in a diligent and 
serious manner: “if it does not accept the SEP holder’s offer, it must promptly 
present to the latter, in writing, a reasonable counter-offer relating to the 
clauses with which it disagrees”12. On the other hand, an infringer’s conduct 
cannot be regarded as dilatory if it can, during or after the negotiations, 
challenge the validity or essentiality of the patent13. With this solution the 
AG sets aside the rigid patent owner friendly approach by the German Court, 
which argued that the infringer must, even before concluding a licensing 
agreement, fulfil the obligations of the future licensing agreement.
IV. A new test of abuse?
In the Huawei case, the Court followed the Opinion of the AG as well as 
the guidelines of the Commission. On July 16, 2015, the CJ issued a landmark 
judgment, recalling that an abuse of dominance will only exist in exceptional 
circumstances and that cases, like the Huawei case, are different from the 
ones concerning refusal to supply intellectual property rights14. In casu the 
Court considered as exceptional circumstances the fact that the patent was 
12 AG Wathelet’s opinion, para. 88.
13 Ibidem.
14 C-170/13 Huawei, paras 46–48.
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essential to a standard and that the SEP holder would have to license in 
FRAND terms. In these circumstances “a refusal by the proprietor of the SEP 
to grant a licence on those terms may, in principle, constitute an abuse within 
the meaning of Article 102 TFEU”15.
In other words, the Court held that the SEP holder does not abuse its 
dominant position in seeking an injunction, as long as “specific requirements” 
are complied with16: (1) The SEP holder must “alert the alleged infringer of 
the infringement complained about by designating that SEP and specifying the 
way in which it has been infringed”17, as a party may not be aware of it; (2) The 
SEP holder must, taking into account the content of other licensing contracts, 
and guided by the principle of non-discrimination, present “a specific, written 
offer for a licence on FRAND terms”, specifying, in particular, the amount 
of the royalty and the way in which that royalty is to be calculated18; (3) The 
alleged infringer must “respond to that offer in accordance with recognised 
commercial practices in the field and in good faith”, without “delaying 
tactics”19. On the other hand, the Court also held that the alleged infringer 
“shall not be banned from challenging the validity, essential nature of the 
patents and /or their actual use”20.
Although, some doubts remain concerning the exact meaning of the 
“willingness test” or whether this decision can also apply to de facto standards, 
in the Huawei case the Court breaks new ground in this field and attempts to 
find an equilibrium between the interests of the SEP holder and the alleged 
infringer21. At the same time, the Court judgment allows the harmonization 
of national solutions, recognizing a “new test of abuse”, supported by the 
European Commission praxis.
In fact, the European Commission, in both of its decisions – Motorola 
and Samsung22 – relied on the overall framework of “wholly exceptional 
15 C-170/13 Huawei, para. 53.
16 C-170/13 Huawei, para. 59.
17 C-170/13 Huawei, paras 60–62.
18 C-170/13 Huawei, paras 63–64. In addition, “parties may, by common agreement, request 
that the amount of the royalty be determined by an independent third party, by decision without 
delay” (C-170/13 Huawei, para. 68).
19 C-170/13 Huawei, para. 65.
20 C-170/13 Huawei, para. 69. Pointing out that the ECJ ruling is “much closer to the 
reality of patent litigation and more practical than the German BGH’s Orange Book-Standard” 
decision, see Körber, 2016.
21 Although this ruling achieved, as pointed out by Oliver and Bombois, 2016, a fair balance 
between the right of property established in article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the EU and the right of access to the courts, provided in article 47 of the Charter, it still 
raises several doubts.
22 Cit. supra notes 7 and 12.
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circumstances”23 to apparently introduce a new test of abuse: the willing 
licensee. Although compulsory licensing and potential abusive litigation tests 
were both invoked before the European institutions, they were not enforced 
and the willing licensee test took precedence.
Regarding compulsory licensing, it is a settled case law in the EU, that 
although a dominant company has “a special responsibility not to allow 
its conduct to impair competition on the common market”24, a refusal by 
a  dominant firm to license IPRs cannot in itself constitute an abuse of 
a dominant position25. However, there are several exceptions to that rule, 
recognized by the CJ. Magill26, IMS27 and Microsoft28 are just the most famous 
examples. In these cases, the Court held that the refusal to license IPRs 
to a competitor by a dominant firm is an abuse if it concerns an essential 
facility, such as copyright over weekly listings necessary to publish a broader 
television guide (Magill), or copyright over the 1860 brick structure, a system 
for collecting pharmaceutical sales data in Germany (IMS) or the interface 
information (Microsoft). In other words, a refusal must concern an input 
necessary to compete on a downstream market, preventing the appearance 
of a new product, the refusal is not objectively justified and the result is the 
elimination of competition.
In the Huawei case, the CJ stressed, endorsing the European Commission 
view in the Samsung and Motorola decisions, that the exceptional circumstances 
in SEPs cases are different from the ones found in the unilateral refusal to 
license judgments29: the patent at stake is a SEP and the holder is prepared 
to grant licences on FRAND terms.
Furthermore, it has been invoked by Motorola, in the first Commission 
decision, as well as by certain authors (Vesterdorf, 2013, p. 109), that the 
abusive litigation test, established in ITT Promedia30 and Protégé Internationale31 
cases, concerning proceedings related with unfair commercial practices and 
trademark oppositions, should also be considered in the SEPs context. In those 
23 As the Court has highlighted in several cases, the list of exceptional circumstances is not 
exhaustive See infra cases: Magill, IMS and Microsoft cases, notes 26–28.
24 ECJ judgement of 9.11.1983, Case 322/81 Michelin, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313, para. 57.
25 ECJ judgment of 5.10.1988, Case 238/87 Volvo v Erik Veng, ECLI:EU:C:1988:477.
26 CJ judgment of 6.04.1995, joined cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P Independent Television 
Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission (Magill), ECLI:EU:C:1995:98.
27 CJ judgment of 29.04.2004, Case C-418/01 IMS Health v NDC Health, ECLI:EU:C:2004:257.
28 CFI judgment of 17.09.2007, Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289.
29 C-170/13 Huawei, para. 48.
30 CFI judgment of 17.07.1998, Case T-111/96 ITT Promedia v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:1998:183.
31 CFI judgment of 13.09.2012, Case T-119/09 Protégé International v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:2012:421.
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cases, the Court held that bringing a judicial action is a fundamental right and 
it can only infringe competition rules in wholly exceptional circumstances: the 
action cannot reasonably be considered an attempt to establish rights and can 
therefore only serve to “harass the opposite party”; and is “conceived in the 
framework of a plan whose goal is to eliminate competition”32. Those criteria 
were not followed by the European institutions (European Commission and 
CJEU) in the SEPs cases. According to those institutions, restrictions on 
a dominant undertaking’s right to enforce its IP in court may be ordered 
in the application of Article 102 TFEU, irrespective of the criteria used in 
ITT Promedia and Protégé International, as the standardization context and 
SEP holder commitment to license on FRAND terms and conditions would 
differentiate these cases from the above mentioned cases. The European 
Commission and the CJEU tend to see SEPs, when FRAND commitments 
were assumed, as special cases that need a special solution for the reasons 
outlined above. The willing licensee test would be, therefore, a new test33 
applied to this new type of abuse.
According to the European institutions the willing licensee test will be 
determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account specific facts. Certain 
guidance was provided by the European Commission in Motorola and Samsung 
decisions: willing licensees include “companies which, in case of dispute, are 
willing to have FRAND terms determined by a court or arbitrators (if agreed 
between the parties) and to be bound by such a determination”34. Outside this 
safe harbour no more guidance was provided.
The AG and the CJ, on the other hand, added in the Huawei case that the 
SEP holder, before seeking injunction, has to alert the alleged infringer to its 
intention in writing, giving reasons and presenting a written offer of a licence 
on FRAND terms with all the information and conditions usually established 
in that sector. If the infringer does not accept the SEP holder’s offer, it must 
32 T-111/96 ITT Promedia, para. 30.
33 This test has, however, been criticized, especially in the beginning, by its ambiguity. 
See Vesterdorf, 2013, p. 1; Vesterdorf, 2008, p. 109; Petit, 2013, p. 677 (tests of abuse that 
treat injunctions as a bargaining device “are economically inconsistent, and should thus be 
disregarded” and it would be problematic if agencies were ever to build theories of antitrust 
liability “on the basis of fictional economic assumptions”; in addition, the act of seeking an 
injunction, or the threat of so doing, “can induce potential licensees to accept unfair terms” 
– Petit, 2013, p. 42). Other authors argue that a “holistic standard”, taking into account 
competition rules, as well as free movement and procedure rules, for limiting injunctions that 
are incompatible with EU law principles, would be better, see Graf, 2014, pp. 73–87.
34 Cf., Antitrust decisions on standard essential patents (SEPs) – Motorola Mobility and 
Samsung Electronics – Frequently asked questions. Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_MEMO-14-322_en.htm (1.05.2015).
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promptly present to the latter, in writing, a reasonable counter-offer relating 
to the clauses with which it disagrees.
In spite of the guidelines presented in this case, uncertainties remain, 
namely concerning the specificity of the licence offer and the timeframe 
for the potential licensee to request a licence. Is it possible, for example, 
for a potential licensee to know all the SEPs involved in the manufacturing 
of the product? Even if the SSO maintain a database of all SEPs, available 
to the public, is it reasonable to demand the potential licensee to know all 
the SEPs necessary to manufacture the product when some of the recent 
studies have shown that there might be billions of them? On the other hand, 
if we accept that the potential licensee needs to be proactive only after the 
dispute, as the Huawei judgment suggests, are we not burdening the SEPs 
owner and affecting the difficult equilibrium of the interests involved? Are 
we not rewarding the infringement of SEPs? What is the reasonable period of 
time for making the offer and the counter offer? How long can negotiations 
last before they are considered dilatory? What constitutes a FRAND offer?35 
The Court has not solved those problems and the open solution given by the 
Advocate General – the time must be assessed in the light of the “commercial 
window of opportunity” available to the SEP holder for securing a return on 
its patent – does not favour legal certainty.
V. A glimpse at the solutions followed by the US and Japan
The doubts still remaining in the EU cases justify a quick look at the US 
and Japan solutions in this field.
In the US, antitrust concerns regarding SEPs can be addressed by Section 2 
of the Sherman Act, similar to Article 102 TFEU, Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act (FCTA) and by the Patent Act through an infringement 
action.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits “monopolization, attempts to 
monopolize, as well as conspiracy to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce between several States or with foreign nations”. Concerning the 
SEP owner’s market power, neither the EU nor the US establish a presumption 
35 In fact, as pointed out by Grasso, 2016a, p. 213–238: “The ECJ ruling in Huawei and 
the right to seek injunctions based on FRAND-Encumbered SEPs under EU Competition 
Law: One step forward”, this is a crucial issue and Huawei, Motorola and Samsung cases do 
not provide any guidance on the methodology that should be followed in order to determine 
the FRAND royalty rate. Some guidance might be provided by the European Commission’s 
Horizontal Guidelines and practice (Grasso, 2016b, pp. 1–12, 5–12).
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of dominance for patent owners (as there is no economic justification for it; in 
fact, in certain cases the standard was not successful in the market or there were 
other standards in the market, or other non standardized products that could 
compete with the standard in casu). In certain cases, however, SEP ownership 
may confer market power, particularly when, in addition to the elimination of 
intra-standard competition as a consequence of the standardization process, 
there is also a restriction on the inter-standard competition36.
Regarding the use of the compulsory licensing test, the approach in the 
US is, nonetheless, slightly different. In the US context, after the uncertainty 
caused by apparently divergent solutions concerning refusal to license in Kodak 
(in this case, the Ninth Circuit considered that there was no valid justification 
for refusal to licence)37 and Xerox (in this case, the Federal Circuit accepted, 
apparently, a quasi-per se legality rule concerning the refusal to license)38 
cases, the Supreme Court clarified the issue in the Trinko judgment39 and 
Aspen Skiing40. The Supreme Court held that under certain circumstances 
there is no duty to license. For example, a refusal to license is unlikely to 
constitute an act of monopolization when satisfying the request of rivals would 
require the dominant firm to share an input that is not indispensable, produce 
an input (or a combination of them) that it does not use, or enter in a new 
joint venture with its competitors.
Section 5 of FCTA can also apply to SEPs holder conduct. It prohibits “unfair 
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices in or affecting commerce”. While this last prohibition is usually 
considered a consumer protection statute (for instance, it applies to misleading 
advertising), the first one may apply to anti-competitive conducts that are not 
36 As it is well known, the Court defined dominant position, in the United Brands judgment, as 
a “position of economic strength which enables the undertaking to impede effective competition 
in a relevant market, by allowing it to behave substantially independently of competitors, 
customers, and consumers” (ECJ judgment of 14.02.1978, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, 
para. 65). In the US, the Supreme Court defined the monopoly power in U.S. v E.I. du Pont 
de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391, as the “power to control prices or exclude competition”. 
In spite of the differences (e.g. the acquisition of a dominant position is not prohibited in 
Article 102, but may be under US antitrust law), both jurisdictions refuse the presumption that 
the mere possession of a patent right confers market power. The assessment of that power will 
be made on a case-by-case basis. See the Horizontal Guidelines (HO 2011/C 11/1, 14.1.2011): 
market power can only be assessed on a case-by-case basis as there is no presumption that 
holding a SEP means the possession of a dominant position.
37 US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, No. 96-16014, Image Technical Service Inc CPO 
v Eastman Kodak Co, February 27, 1998.
38 SCM Corp v Xerox Corp. 645 F2d. 1195 (2d Cir 1981).
39 Verizon Communications, Inc. v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP 540 US 398, 124 S.Ct. 
872, 157 L.Ed.2d 823 (2004).
40 Aspen Skiing v Aspen Highlands Skiing, 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
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prohibited by the Sherman Act, such as invitation to collude (usually unilateral 
solicitations to enter into unlawful horizontal price-fixing or market allocation 
agreements)41.
In addition, in the United States, infringement actions are brought under 
the Patent Act in Federal District Courts. Since the US Supreme Court’s 
decision in eBay, Inc. v MercExchange, L.L.C42, the Federal District Courts 
have the discretion to grant injunctions to stop patent infringement as long 
as the balance of traditional equitable factors, including a consideration of 
the public interest, weigh in favour of granting injunctive relief. Recently, 
two US Federal District Courts have applied the eBay factors (the plaintiff 
must demonstrate that it has suffered an irreparable injury; remedies available 
at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that 
injury; considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and the 
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and the public interest would not 
be disserved by a permanent injunction) to deny injunctive relief to holders 
of SEPs (Judge Robart in Microsoft v Motorola43 and Judge Posner in Apple 
v Motorola44). It means that the patent owner cannot obtain an injunction, 
but rather must settle for damages only. Both cases are on appeal at the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Another US federal 
district court, however, came to a different conclusion. Judge Crabb in Apple 
v Motorola45 concluded that a FRAND commitment to an SSO, like any other 
contractual arrangement, does not deprive the SEP holder of the right to seek 
injunctive relief.
An alternative to Federal Court litigation is the filing with the US 
International Trade Commission (hereinafter, ITC) of a request for an order 
excluding imports of products that the ITC finds in violation of US patents. 
The ITC provides a second forum as long as the patentee can assert a patent 
infringement claim to stop the importation of infringing products. The ITC is 
required to issue an exclusion order upon the finding of a Section 337 violation 
(as long as the public interest does not favour another solution, in which case 
the US Trade Representative overturns the ITC order on public interest).
In this context, it is also important to refer that in January 2013 the US 
Justice Department (hereinafter, DOJ) and the US Patent and Trademark 
41 In fact, the FCT considered in the Rambus case (Rambus, Inc., No. 9302. FCT August 2, 
2006) that the undertaking’s conduct (patent ambush) was a standalone violation of section 5 
(which was, however, later dismissed by the Court, without clarifying the scope of the provision).
42 Cf. eBay, Inc. v MercExchange, L.L.C, 547 US 388 (2006).
43 Microsoft Corp. v Motorola, Inc. (Case No. 14-35393), US Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit (San Francisco).
44 Apple v Motorola, No. 1:11-cv-08540 (N.D. III, June 22, 2012).
45 Apple v Motorola, Fed. Cir. 2013 – 1150-1182.
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Office (hereinafter, PTO) jointly issued a Policy Statement on SEPs Subject 
to Voluntary FRAND Commitments46 in which the agencies explained that 
the remedy of an injunction or exclusion order may be inconsistent with the 
public interest, particularly in cases where an SEP owner has made a FRAND 
commitment to a standard setting body. The PTO-DOJ Statement noted, 
however, that an exclusion order may still be an appropriate remedy in some 
circumstances, such as where the putative licensee is unable or refuses to 
take a FRAND licence and is acting outside the scope of the patent holder’s 
commitment to license on FRAND terms. In this context, the PTO-DOJ 
Statement identified a non-exhaustive list of relevant factors when determining 
whether public interest considerations should prevent the issuance of an 
exclusion order or when shaping such a remedy.
Finally, in two separate settlement agreements (which will therefore 
unlikely be used as precedents) in 2012 and 2013, the FTC required Motorola 
Mobility and Bosch GmbH not to seek injunctions on SEPs, except under 
limited circumstances enumerated by the FTC. The FTC also indicated that 
in appropriate circumstances, it might challenge SEP holders’ efforts to obtain 
injunctions as “unfair methods of competition” in violation of Section 5 of 
the FTC Act47.
In Japan, antitrust concerns regarding SEPs can be addressed either by 
the Patent Act or the Civil Code. The Patent Act has provisions concerning 
compulsory licensing (for example Article 93), which are rarely used. In the 
case of standard essential patents, it has been argued, however, that the most 
likely scenario is the grant of compulsory (non-exclusive) licence for public 
interest (Kimura, 2012)48 by the Japan Patent Office Commissioner or the 
Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry.
Concerning the Japanese Civil Code, it is pointed out that Article 1 provides 
that “No abuse of rights is permitted”. Courts “rarely restricted the patentee 
from exercising a right to seek an injunction by applying this provision on an 
abuse of rights” (Tonda, 2013). Article 1 can only apply as long as the exercise 
of the patent right is contrary to the purpose of the Patent Act (contribute to 
the development of industrial society) and is unacceptable in society in light 
of the circumstances of the case.
46 Retrieved from: http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ 290994.pdf (1.5.2016).
47 Retrieved from: http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210081/121126boschanalysis.pdf and from: 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130103googlemotorolastmtofcomm.pdf. (1.05.2016).
48 No compulsory license has been granted until now; even when a standard is found 
necessary for the public interest, the product using the SEP may not be found necessary for 
the public interest.
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On January 23, 2014, the Japanese IP High Court announced that the 
Japanese Apple/Samsung FRAND case would be the matter of a Grand 
Panel and asked, for the first time, for public comments on the question 
whether there should be any restriction on the right to seek an injunction 
and damages based on a standard essential patent (SEP) in respect of which 
a FRAND declaration was made (58 Amicus Briefs were filed in response to 
the question)49.
In this case, Samsung had sought a preliminary injunction against the 
importation and sale of certain models of Apple devices that allegedly infringed 
a standard-essential patent, subject to a FRAND obligation. In response, 
Apple filed an action seeking a declaration that its devices did not infringe 
a SEP, and that Samsung did not have a right to claim damages. In February 
2013, the Tokyo District Court held that Samsung could not seek damages 
from Apple for the infringement of a SEP, due to Samsung’s ‘abuse of right’. 
The court rejected Samsung’s argument that Apple was not willing to license 
as its offer reserved the right to contest validity and held: “There are no 
express provisions regarding the duties of parties at the stage of preparation 
for contract execution (…) it is reasonable to understand that, in certain cases, 
parties that have entered into contract negotiations owe a duty to each other 
under the principle of good faith to provide the other party with important 
information and to negotiate in good faith”50.
On May 16, 2014, the Grand Panel of the Intellectual Property High Court 
ruled that Samsung did not have a right to seek an injunction against Apple 
Japan concerning the SEP with FRAND commitments and modified the 
Tokyo District Court regarding damages51. It held that the enforcement of 
a FRAND pledged patent right – with a claim of damages – did not constitute 
an abuse of right if the amount of damages claimed was within the scope of the 
licence fee based on the FRAND condition. In other words, it is an abuse of 
monopoly, if a SEP holder seeks to obtain more damages than the ones that 
could have been obtained on FRAND terms, unless there are special reasons 
such as the alleged infringer not having any intent to take a FRAND license52.
To sum up, although US and Japan apply different laws, the goal is the 
same: protect the interests of the SEP owner, while avoiding abusive recourse 
to injunctions.
49 Cf. http://www.worldipreview.com/article/japan-the-year-in-review (1.05.2016).
50 Apple Japan Limited Liability Company (Plaintiff) v Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. 
(Defendant), Tokyo District Court/Judgment of Feb. 28, 2013/Case No. 2011 (wa) No. 38969; 
Case to seek declaration of non-existence of liability, 38 AIPPI J. 174 (2013).
51 Cf. http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/hanrei/g_panel/index.html (1.05.2015).
52 Cf. http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/ (1.05.2015).
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VI. National judgments
In Europe, after the Huawei case, two German courts granted injunctions 
to SEP holders. On 3 November 2015, the Düsseldorf Regional Court granted 
injunctive relief to Sisvel, a SEP holder, against Haier, as it distributed UMTS 
and GPRS compatible mobile devices infringing Sisvel’s SEP53. The German 
Court did not assess whether Sisvel’s proposal was FRAND because the 
counteroffer did not meet Huawei’s condition. In other words, the national 
court did not assess the initial offer and rejected the FRAND defence, because 
Haier did not provide an account and security for the payment of royalties and 
it had to take place within a month after the rejection of the counteroffer by 
the patent holder. The Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf (appeals court) 
suspended, however, the enforcement of the injunction. It found that the lower 
court did not apply the Huawei standards correctly. The lower court had to 
decide whether Sisvel’s offer was on FRAND terms, so it needed to determine 
the reasonableness of the royalty rate and other licence terms. It means that 
the alleged infringer is not required to propose a FRAND counteroffer if the 
offer received is not FRAND.
On 27 November 2015, the Regional Court Mannheim, in Saint Lawrence 
Communications v Deutsche Telekom54, granted an injunction against Deutsche 
Telekom based on a European patent, which was found to be essential for the 
AMR-WB standard, relevant for wideband audio coding used in HD-Voice 
transmission. Saint Lawrence Communications, a European subsidiary of 
Acacia Research Group LLC, was the patentee. The products offered by 
Deutsche Telekom (DT) included mobile phones supplied by HTC and several 
other handset manufacturers, therefore, HTC and others participated in the 
proceedings as interveners in support of DT. The German Court assessed only 
the counteroffer and rejected the FRAND defence. It considered insufficient 
the counteroffer made by the HTC (supplier of the accused devices)55 as it did 
not specify the royalty rate (the royalties would have to be determined by the 
53 Joined cases 4a O 93/14 and 4a O 144/14, summary retrieved from: www.eplawpatentblog.
com/eplaw/2015/11/de-sisvel-v-qingdao-haier-group-first-german-injunction-after-cjeu- frand-
decision.html.
54 Regional Court of Mannheim, case no. 2 O 106/14 – Saint Lawrence Communications 
v Deutsche Telekom, summary retrieved from: eplaw.org/document/de-summary-mannheim-
district-court/ (last visited 1.1.2017).
55 It must also be pointed out that, contrary to the CJ guidelines, Saint Lawrence first filed 
the action and then put Deutsche Telekom on notice. But, as Deutsche Telekom was unwilling 
to take a licence (it considered itself merely a distributor) and HTC waited over three months 
to indicate its willingness to license, that notice of infringement was not given too late.
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High Court of England and Wales)56. A Mannheim court, like the Düsseldorf 
Regional Court, required that the counteroffer was made on FRAND terms, 
even if the potential licensee was not contacted before the action was brought.
Both courts did not review the plaintiff’s offer for FRAND compliance; 
they focused in the counteroffer. Thus, it seems that the burden of making 
a successful FRAND defence is still mainly on the defendant, according to the 
lower German courts. Fortunately, the Court of Appeals took into account 
the Huawei’s judgment.
VII. Conclusion
There is a general presumption against injunctions in SEPs encumbered 
with FRAND commitments, in the US, in the EU and in Japan. Although 
the laws applied may be different – patent and competition laws in the US, 
mainly civil law in Japan, and competition law in the EU (and these different 
approaches reflect different influences provided by different economic schools 
as well as different antitrust enforcement models) – the goal is the same: 
to protect the interests of the SEP holder to obtain a remuneration, while 
avoiding an abusive recourse to injunctions.
In the European context the national approaches to patents and SEPs holders 
seeking injunctions against infringers can also be quite different. Therefore, 
the Huawei case may have a significant impact, allowing the harmonization 
of national judicial solutions regarding the seeking of injunctions in the SEPs 
context. Furthermore, it can improve clarity and certainty for the companies 
involved (and for the industry in general) in standardization across Europe. In 
fact, the CJ endorsed the AG proposal as well as the European Commission 
decisions, setting a new test for a new type of abuse: the willing licensee. In 
spite of some uncertainties concerning the specificity of the licensing agreement 
offered by the defendant, or the time frame in which that agreement must be 
negotiated, the new test clarifies the role that competition rules should play 
in cases of abuses by SEPs owners.
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